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Elite Recruitment and National Socialism:
The SS-Fuhrerkorps, 1925 -1939
Herbert F Ziegler
Adolf Hitler, along with most of his disciples and supporters, professed and
indeed beheved that National Socialism was a revolutionary movement and,
regardless of the Interpretation of Nazism that is espoused, "the authenticity of
the revolutionary Impulse is undeniable 1)
"
Ostensibly the Third Reich would
usher in "a new social order in which class conflict and ideological cleavages
would disappear and be replaced by a sense of national sohdanty and by a com¬
mitment on the part of every individual to put the interests of the nation before
seif (Gememnutz vor Eigennutz) 2)."
The abstraction employed by National Sociahsm to portray their social model
was the backward ideal of a racial Community, or Volksgemeinschaft,
a countermodel, as it were, to the 'class society' diagnosed by its pohtical oppo
nents of the Left Part and parcel of the Nazi concept of the Volksge¬
meinschaft was a disdain for and aversion to the rigid immobility of
traditional social hierarchies, coupled with the resolve to conquer the antiquat
ed and restnctive ehte criteria ofmhented birthnght and social rank 3)
Notwithstanding the obvious and often noted "archaic and atavistic 4)"
ingredients of Nazi ideology and the alleged backward looking, reactionary char-
acter of Nazism's mass support, there can be detected in Hitler's movement an
undemably modern appeal proffenng social mobihty 5)
If the concept of the people's Community with its emphasis on social mobi
1) Leonard Krieger, "Nazism Highway or Byway?" in Central European History
11 (March 1978) pp 3 22, here 14
2) Jeremy N o a k e s and Geoffrey P r l d h a m, Nazism 1919 1945 2 vols (Exe
ter, 1984), p 376
3) John H i d e n and John Farquharson, Explaining Hitler's Germany Histo
nans and the Third Reich (London, 1983), p 86 suggest that the concept of the people's
Community must be taken more seriously than it sometimes has been
4) Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation
(London, 1985), p 147
5) Kershaw, Problems and Perspectives, pp 134, 147 Jeremy N o a k e s, "Na
zism and Revolution," in Noel O'Sullivan, ed , Revolutionary Theory and Political
reahty (London, 1983), p 85 states that the concept of careers open to talent had been an
articie of faith since the very earliest days, reflecting a resentment at the traditional barners
of upward mobihty posed by birth, property, and education For modern aspects of Nazism
see also Martin B r o s z a t, "Zur Struktur der NS Massenbewegung," in Vierteljahres
heft für Zeitgeschichte 31 (1983) pp 52 76 and Timothy W M a s o n, "Zur Entstehung
des Gesetzes zur Ordnung der nationalen Arbeit, vom 20 Januar 1934 Ein Versuch über
das Verhältnis 'archaischer* und 'moderner' Momente in der neuesten deutschen Geschieh
te," in Hans Mommsen etal, eds , Industrielles System und pohtische Entwicklung
in der Weimarer Repubhk (Dusseldorf, 1974) pp 322 51
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hty was more than simple election rhetoric or cosmetic veneer of NS ideology,
the social or Substantive content of the Nazi revolutionshouldbe readily discern-
ible in the recruitment practices of German elites. In the event that the Nazis
were truly committed to the idea of an open elite they, in the aftermath of the
seizure of power, should have begun to practice something akin to a democracy
in personnel selection.
In an effort to test empirically the notion of "openness" of National Sociahst
ehtes 6), and the closely related subject of fostering social mobility, we have
analyzed three variables which serve as proxy indicators of class Standings of the
pre-war SS-Führerkorps. These highly interrelated variables are "fa-
ther's occupation", the
" Führer' s occupation learned", and the "F ü h -
r e r
'
s educational attainment." By establishing with as much precision as
possible the social base of the pre-war SS leadership, we hope to answer one
principal question: what proportion of SS leaders came from any given segment
of society ?7) Put differently, do the social origins of Himmler's recruits justify
the characterization of SS policies as emphasizing the selection of the able for
high posts, regardless of social position? were they policies which opened up new
possibilities for the lower classes while eschewing the privileges of the upper
classes?. Indeed, was S S-Obergruppenführer Mathias Kleinheißter-
kamp correct when he remarked, "this is how it is in the SS, a coachman is
Untersturmführer (2nd Lieutenent) while an educated person is
Scharführer (Sergeant)" 8).
The Data: Sources, Selection, and Sampling
This work is based on data relating to the lives of 1,947 SS-Führer who
6) The question conceming the social recruitment of the NS movement is as old as the NS
success. A comprehensive account of published sources conceming NSDAP members, lead¬
ers and voters is provided by Eike H e n n i g, Bürgerliche Gesellschaft und Faschismus
in Deutschland. Ein Forschungsbericht (Frankfurt/M. 1977), pp. 157 - 233. See also Peter
D. Stachura, "Who were the Nazis? A Socio-Political Analysis of the National Social -
ist Machtübernahme," European Studies Review II (1981), 293 - 324.
7) The scope of our analysis is limited, therefore, to the attributes, circumstances, and mo-
tives of the individuals firom each social class who decided to join the SS. Though frequently
overlooked, the reason for this limitation is obvious. There is the temptationto makegener-
alizations about an entire class based on the findings on the social make-up of a particular
Organization when in fact only a proportion of a given class belonged to the Organization
in question. Put simply, because a particular fraction of the SS membership was recruited
firom a certain section of society does not mean that the entire class responded en bloc.
Should we find, for instance, that some thirty percent of the SS leadership was recruited
firom the upper Stratum of German bourgeois society this does not imply that thirty percent
of the entire upper class joined the SS, but only a minute minority. This point has been
made by Richard F. Hamilton, "Reply to Commentators," Central European History
27 (1984) p. 73.
8) Berlin Document Center, Personnel File of Mathias Kleinheissterkamp.
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held the rank of SS-Untersturmführer or higher before 1939.
Individual SS-Führer were identified by way of the Dienstalters¬
liste der Schutzstaffel der NSDAP, Stand 31.12.1938,
Bearbeitet von der Personalkanzlei (Berlin, 1938), which furnished the names
and other identifying information ofall SS-Führer according to rank.
This rankstratifled list was subdivided into three strata consisting of the S S -
Totenkopfverbände (SS- TV), the SS-Verfügungs¬
truppe ( S S - V T), and the Allgemeine SS ( A 1 1 g . S S ). Once the
Führer were identified, biographical information on them was coUected
from the SS personnel records of the Berlin Document Center 9).
These records are divided into two collections: (1) the SS Officer Files
(SSO) containing folders of varying completeness for 61,465 SS-Führer
and (2) and flies of the Race and Settlement Main Office (RuSHA), comprising
some 238,00 folders pertaining to Führer, Unterführer, and enlisted
personnel of the SS. Both collections were used extensively in order to collect
biographical information on all members of the SS-Totenkop fver-
bände, the SS-Verfügungstruppe, and a randomly selected
sample of Allgemeine-SS members. In the event that certain items
could not be located among these records,because some entries were illegible or
simply missing, an attempt as made to locate the desired information from the
SA and NSDAP Masterfiles of the Berhn Document Center. Because the T V
and V T strata had relatively few cases (N = 437 and N = 766 respectively),
data were coUected on aU those individuals who belonged to either of these
groups. As to the Allg. SS, which was so large (total population N =
12,669) as to render collection of data on all individuals redundant, a systematic
random sample of 900 men was chosen to represent this branch of the SSl°).
Because records for a very small number of individuals could not be located,
and some information was not identifiable where documents had been damaged,
the final samples consist of 400 S S - T V, 692 S S - V T and 851 Allg.
S S members (total N = 1943) H). Members of the SS-Sicherheit s-
9) The holdings of the BDC are described in George C. B r o w d e r, "Problems and Po¬
tentials of the Berhn Document Center," Central European History 4 (1972), pp. 362 - 380.
10) Standard works on sampling inciude W. G. Cochran, Sampling Techniques (New
York, 1953) and Taro Y a m a n e, Elementary Sampling Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.
J., 1967), Also helpful are L. K i s h, "Selection of a Sample," in:L. Festinger
and D. Katz, eds. Research Methods in the Social Sciences (New York, 1953) and Ber¬
nard Lazerwitz, "Sampling Theory and Procedures," in: Hubert M. Blalcok
and Ann B. B 1 a 1 o c k, eds., Methodology in Social Research (New York, 1968).
11) Samples are coUected as a matter of convenience, and the usual goal of Statistical
analysis is to make inferences about population parameters on the basis of known but
intrinsically unimportant sample statistics. Thus, it is not enough to merely establish possi¬
ble relationships or differences between variables, or delineate the strength or direction of
relationships. but one must also determine whether or not the results found in the sample
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dienst and so-called SS-Ehrenführer (honorary Commanders) are
purposely not included in the sample 12). The former represented a separate
Organization 13) that was distinct in functional terms, and the latter, were not
actuaUy part of the SS Organization. SS-Ehrenführer was a title
granted to persons of influence and power in the Third Reich who were permit-
tedtowearSS uniforms, usuaUy carried high ranks, but had no direct command
authority 14).
Two guiding principles for coding data were used. First, whenever possible, the
information on SS members was coded and categorized in a manner that con-
forms to the criteria used by the German Statistical Office and, in many in-
stances, to those employed by other scholars. Such a coding scheme has an
important advantage. It affords a direct comparison between the distributional
characteristics of the SS-Führerkorps and the German population on
the one hand, and between the SS-Führerkorps, the leadership of the
SA and the general membership of the NSDAP on the other — comparisons
without which the presentation of any results on the SS itself become relatively
actually existed in the population represented by the sample or samples. The accepted pro-
cedure toward this end is to perform tests of Statistical significance, and we have calculated
the appropriate measures for aU numerical relationships discussed and presented in this
work. Whenever use was made of contingency table analysis in order to establish bivariate
relationships. a chi-square test was computed; when comparisons of sample means were
made to test mean differences, a student's t statistic was computed. Unless otherwise indi¬
cated, the level of significance adopted was 05. As to Statistical significance, the latter
should not be confused with practical or Substantive significance. For a discussion of this
subject see Sanford L a b o v i t z, "Criteria for Selecting a Significance Level: A Note
on the Sacredness of .05
"
in: American Sociologist 3 (1968), pp. 220 - 222; James K.
S k i p p e r, Anthony L. Guenther, and Gilbert Mass, "The Sacredness of .05:
A Note Conceming the Use of Statistical Levels of Significance," in: The American Socio¬
logist 1 (1967), pp. 16 - 16; Thomas J. Duggan and Charles W. Dean, "Common
Misinterpretations of Significance Levels in Sociological Journals," in: The American Socio¬
logist 3 (1968) pp. 45-46; David G o u 1 d, "Statistical Tests and Substantive Signifi¬
cance," in: The American Sociologist 4 (1969), pp. 42 - 46; R. F. Finch and D. T.
C a m p e 1 1, "Proof? No. Evidence? Yes. The Significance of Significance Tests," in: The
American Sociologist 4 (1969), pp. 140 -143; D. Morrison and R. Henkel, eds.,
The Significance Test Controversy (Chicago, 1970); K. W. Taylor and James
F r i d e r e s, "Issues versus Controversies: Substantive and Statistical Significance," in:
American Sociological Review 37 (1972), pp. 464 - 472.
12) In order to identify Ehrenführer we relied on the judgment of Egon Bur-
chartz, Chief of the Evaluation Section, BDC, who is intimately familiär with the personnel
of the SS. He was asked to identify from the Dienstaltersliste of 31.12.1938
any Führer who to his knowledge was an Ehrenführer.
13) Robert L. K o e h 1, The Black Corps. The Structure and Struggles of the Nazi SS
(Madison, 1983), p. 107,
14) Ermenhild Neusüss-Hunkel, Die SS. (Schriftenreihe des Instituts für wissen¬
schaftliche Politik in Marburg/Lahn, No. 2) (Hannover, 1956), pp.15,21; Organisationsbuch
der NSDAP (1943), 435.
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meaningless. Relating the social profile of SS-Führer to that of Nazi
party members or SS-Führer permits us to place findings on the SS within
the context of National Socialist organizations, and hence in a more balanced
perspective. For example, did the social origins of average SS leaders, most of
whom who were also Party members, differ from that of typical NSDAP
members and SA leaders and, if so, how did they differ? Likewise, comparing
the SS leadership with the German population helps identify those social attri-
butes which might have given individuals advantages or disandvantages in the
quest for SS elite Status. Because the incidence of characteristics in the populace
can be interpreted as the distribution that would be randomly expected among
SS-Führer, this method furnishes a means for assessing the degree — as well
as direction — of social biases in the recruitment process. Specifically, the
social profile of the SS elite is compared to the literate adult male population
— or its nearest approximation 15). This population is much more appropriate
for this sort of comparison than the total population at large, because illiterates
were obviously marginal to the political system, children had no direct access
to ist, and women by and large played no role in it. Therefore, unless other-
wise indicated, the population is defined as the male population aged 18 - 60,
as definded by the German census.
The second principle which directed the coding of information is that any
variable should capture as closely as possible the social and economic reahties
of the time period. In most instances this was not a problem, and coding of in¬
formation was relatively straightforward, as in the case of data on education, for
example. Problems did arise, however, in connection with the critical issue of
what part of the SS support came from a given social layer (Schicht) 16)
or class. The identification of such groups or classes, both within the population
and the SS, was a major task requiring considerable methodological reflection.
Unfortunately the latter cannot be taken up here in detail. Suffice it to State
that our coding and Classification schemes lean heavily on those employed by
Michael Kater in his recent study on the NSDAP 17).
Discussion of Findings
The first notable feature of our data on both paternal occupation and the
occupation cited by each Führer is the relatively high proportion of indi-
15) Mandatory education through age 14 and regularity of attendance based on powerful
sanctions resulted in extremely low illiteracy rates for German males. See Peter S a n d i-
for d, ed , Comparative Education: Studies of the Educational System of Six Modern Na¬
tions (London, 1918).
16) The more common term "class" will be employed throughout this book.
17) Michael M. Kater, The Nazi Party, A Social Profile of Members and Leaders. 1919
-1945 (Cambridge, MA, 1983).
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viduals that can be classifled as fnanual workers 18). To be more precise, if we
designate the sum of the first three categories in Table 1 as the lower class or
working class, we find that roughly one quarter of the SS ehte was recruited
from this segment of society. Admittedly, men of working class background
were underrepresented vis a vis the general population 19), but there is no es-
caping the conclusion that the SS and its leadership corps were extraordinarily
successful in attracting support from workers. No traditional German ehte could
boast such representation from a class whose occupational and social Status was
equally low in both Imperial and Weimar Germany. It remains a remarkable
accomphshment to have recruited a significant number of workers into the lead¬
ership of the most notorious and anti-socialist elite formation of the Third
Reich.
Our own data on the S S -Führerkorps also indicate that in terms of
absolute numbers at least, the largest segment of the pre-war SS leadership was
recruited from the lower-middle class 20). To put this finding into the proper
perspective, note should be made of the fact that the case for the preponderance
of lower-middle class origins is compelling only with respect to data on the
occupations of fathers. As far as the occupational structure of SS recruits is con¬
cemed, this social Stratum was neither underrepresented nor overrepresented in
the leadership of the SS. The proportion of SS members with a lower-middle
class background matched almost precisely the proportion this class constituted
in German society in general.
18) This contrasts greatly with the findings of Bernd W e g n e r, Hitler's Politische Sol¬
daten: Die Waffen-SS 1933 - 1945 (Paderborn, 1982), 225 Table 17,which founda9,8%
combination of Arbeiter und Angestellte among the SS leadership. To put these findings
into perspective, Wegner collected data only on the upper ranks of the SS-Führerkorps.
Thus, he collected data on all Führer firom the rank of Standartenführer
and upward, and sampled approximately one forth of the Sturmbannführer and
Obersturmbannführer who belonged to the field units of the Waffen-S S
(see p. 208). An even lower estimate of working class origins for SS leaders is cited by Gun¬
nar C. Boehnert, A Sociography of the SS Officer Corps, 1925 -1939 (London, 1978
Ph. D. Dissertation). Although tables 6.1 and 6.3 show 6.3 % under the rubric "sküled wor¬
kers", Boehnert (p. 165) concludes that only 1.1 % of the sampled officers belonged to the
Arbeiterschicht,
19) Depending on the definition, the proportion of workers hovered around 46 to 50 per¬
cent of the total population in the 1920s and 1930s. See for example Statistisches Jahrbuch
für das Deutsche Reich (Berlin, 1935), 17 where the proportion of workers in the popula¬
tion (excluding military) is cited as 46 and 46.3 percent in 1925 and 1933 respectively.
Gerd H a r d a c h, "Klassen und Schichten in Deutschland 1848 -1970. Probleme einer
historischen Strukturanalyse," in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 3 (1977), p. 518 cites the
proportion of workers as 55, 49, and 49 percent in 1907, 1925, and 1939 respectively.
20) B o e h n e r t, SS Officer Corps. 163 -164, 206 and Tables 6.1 and 6.3 respective¬
ly calculated that some 59 % of SS leaders came from the lower middle class.
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Another important missive provided by the same data is that the majority of
SS recruits Coming from a lower-middle class müieu held white collar jobs be¬
fore joining Heinrich Himmler's Organization 21). Among the F u h r e r
'
s
occupations, roughly thirty percent were classified as salaried employees. The
number of civil servants, on the other hand, was quite small 22). In compari¬
son to the population, where approximately five percent where classified as
lower or intermediate civil servants, the same occupations were underrepresent¬
ed in the SS leadership. As to the fathers' occupations, a total of about forty
percent feil into the categories of white collar employees and civü servants, with
each category making up about twenty percent respectively. The strong presence
within the NSDAP and its electorate of salaried employees who faced much
economic uncertainty, and lower civil servants who were hkely to be disgruntled
by salary reductions and disenchanted by a parhamentary democracy which
seemingly became increasingly Marxist-oriented, has been noted 23).
Because of the high proportion of salaried employees among the recruits (and
civil servants among the fathers), occupations of the old lower-middle class were
correspondingly scarce. Among SS-Führer the independent craftsmen
21) On the economic Situation of the white collar workers in general see, Winkler,
Extremismus, 185, Hans S p e l e r, Die Angestellten vor dem Nationalsozialismus Em
Beitrag zum Verständnis der deutschen Sozialstruktur 1918
- 1933 (Gottingen, 1977), p
93, Jürgen K o c k a, "Zur Problematik der deutschen Angestellten 1914 - 1933," in:
Hans M o m m s e n, ed , Industrielles System und politische Entwicklung in der Wei¬
marer Repubhk (Dusseldorf, 1974), pp 792 - 811, and by the same author, Die Angestell
ten in der deutschen Geschichte 1850 - 1980 Vom Privatbeamten zum angestellten Arbeit¬
nehmer (Gottingen, 1977), pp. 142- 176
22) From the mid-twentiesto Hitler's assumption ofpower lower civil servants were overre-
presented in the NSDAP Kater, Nazi Party, 41 42. For the position of civil servants
before Hitler's assumption of power see Hans M o m m s e n, "DieStellung der Beamten¬
schaft in Reich, Lander und Gemeinden in der Ära Brunung," in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeit
geschichte 21 (1973), pp 151 - 165 and Wolfgang Rüge, Politik und Beamtentum im
Parteistaat. Die Demokratisierung der pohtischen Beamten in Preussen zwischen 1918 und
1933 (Stuttgart, 1965). The ambivalence of the NSDAP towards Germany's civil service has
been noted by Jane Caplan, "Speaking the Right Language. The Nazi Party and the
Civil Service Vote in the Weimar Republic," pp 182 - 201, in Thomas Childers, ed.,
The Formation of the Nazi Constituency 1919 - 1933 ^London, 1986) For the Hitler era
see Hans M o m m s e n, Beamtentum im Dritten Reich. Mit ausgewählten Quellen zur
nationalsozialistischen Beamtenpohtik (Stuttgart, 1966) and Jane Caplan, "The Po¬
litics of Administration The Reich Intenor Ministry and the German Civil Service," Histo
neal Journal 20 (1977), pp. 707 - 736.
23) Kater, Nazi Party, pp. 41 - 43; Geoffrey P r i d h a m, Hitler's Rise to Power
The Nazi Movement in Bavaria 1923 -1933 (London, 1973), p. 193; Thomas Childers, "The
Social Bases of the National Socialist Vote," in: Journal of Contemporary History 11
(1976), p. 23, N o a k e s and P r l d h a m, Documentary Reader, p. 90; Hans M o m-
m s e n, "Die Stellung der Beamtenschaft in Reich, Landern und Gemeinden in der Ära
Bruning," in. Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 21 (1973), pp. 154 -155, M o m m s e n,
"Beamtentum," pp. 197-99
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and the owners of small shops could hardly be found, and even farmers were no-
tably underrepresented 24). The sum of all occupations that embraced the
Alte Mittelstand amounted to five to eight percent of all occupations
cited by SS members. By comparison, the same categories of independent
craftsmen, small businessmen, and farmers constituted about twenty four
percent of all occupations in the German population. The same pattern holds
for the occupational structure of fathers. Although the proportion of the old
middle class-type occupations tended to be higher than they were among their
sons, they were either less than or equal to the proportion of occupations
that would be expected from the distribution in the population. Thus, although
it may well be true that shopkeepers and craftsmen were harmed by the growth
of factories and department stores, and suffered from a feeling of neglect and
sociopohtical isolation 25) and despite the fact that farmers faced economic
phght on form of declining income and foreclosures 26), the old lower middle
class did not serve as an important recruiting reservoir for the SS-Führer¬
korps.
The upper ranks of the Mittelstand as represented by the occupational
categories of "managers", "high level civil servants", "military officers", and
"Professionals" (and students in the case of Führer) were all heavily over-
24) These figures must have been disappointing to Himmler who was so fondofdreaming
ofa Greater Germanic Empire in which German peasant settlers would play an important
role. For Himmler's interest in the plight of the German farmer and his personal role in the
Propaganda efforts of the NSDAP see Johnpeter Horst Grill, "The Nazi Party's Rural
Propaganda Before 1928," in: Central European History (15 June, 1982), pp. 149 - 185,
here pp. 171-173.
25) Kater, Nazi Party, p. 24. Jeremy Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony 1921 -
1933 (Oxford, 1973), pp. 110 - 11 argues that the feeling of neglect and isolation drove
these people away from the conservative right toward the Nazi radical right. The economic
suffering of shopkeepers and craftsmen has been put into proper perspective by Heinrich
A. W i n k 1 e r, Mittelstand, Demokratie and Nationalsozialismus. Die politische Entwick¬
lung von Handwerk und Kleinhandel in der Weimarer Republic (Cologne, 1972), pp. 30, 79,
104-106.
26) According to Kater, Nazi Party, pp. 39 - 41 farmers flocked to the NSDAP after
1928, and bore a major responsibility for Hitler's victory in 1930. See also, Werner T.
Angress, "The Political Role of the Peasantry in the Weimar Repubhk," in: Review of Poli¬
tics 21 (1959), pp. 538 - 540; Johann D o r n e r, Bauernstand und Nationalsoziahsmus
2nd ed. (Munich, 1930), pp. 12 - 13, 22, 40 - 41; Onno P o p p i n g a, Bauern und Poli¬
tik (Frankfurt/Main and Cologne, 1975), pp. 44 - 45; Hans-Jürgen P u h 1 e, Pohtische Ag-
rarbewegungen in kapitalistischen Industriegesellschaften: Deutschland, USA und Frank¬
reich im 20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen, 1975), p. 90; John E. Farquharson, The
Plough and the Swastika, The NSDAP and Agriculture in Germany. 1928 - 45 (London and
Beverly Hüls, 1976), p. 26; Larry E. Jones, "Inflation, Revaluation, and the Crisis of
Middle-Class Politics: A Study in the Dissolution of the German Party System, 1923 - 28,
in. Central European History 12 (1979), pp. 146 - 147; Rudolf H e b e r 1 e, Landbe¬
völkerung und Nationalsozialismus: Eine soziologische Untersuchung der politischen WÜ-
lensbildungin Schleswig-Holstein 1918 -1932 (Stuttgart, 1963).
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represented in the SS leadership relative to their strength in the Reich 27).
Compared to the Reich, where only about 3 percent of the population would
have been classified as Upper middle class according to our criteria, some seven-
teen to twenty percent of the fathers and roughly one third of the F u h r e r
matched this category. Among the fathers this overall overrepresentation is
fairly consistent from one job category to the next, that is, on the average
paternal occupations classified as upper middle class occupations were usually
five times higher than the corresponding categories were for the general popula¬
tion. As to the SS-Fuhrer themselves, the picture is a little more diverse.
Although in general SS members had twice the representation of upper middle
class occupations that their fathers did, there was a good deal of Variation in
the proportions of individual occupational categories. Whereas those SS re¬
cruits who listed themselves as management level employees made up between
.8 to 1.6 percent, and the higher civil servants 28) constituted a mere 1.0 to
2.0 percent, of all occupations, the so-called entrepreneurial category was
void of even a single individual. These relatively low figures are of course
balanced by the conspicuously high proportion of recruits who listed them¬
selves as "professionals" and "students" 29). Depending on the SS branch
to which an individual belonged, some twelve to twenty percent of all SS leaders
claimed to have held or at least trained for professional occupations. Among
the professionals, the majority included health care professionals such as
physicians 30) and, to a lesser degree, dentists, and a few vetennarians, while
the second largest contingent of professionals consisted principally of attorneys.
27) Our findings here are in total agreement with those by Kater, Nazi Party, p 27
who estabhshed that the "ehtes were consistently overrepresented in the Party since its very
beginmngs" W e g n e r, Pohtische Soldaten, p 223 indicates that 45 to 50 percent of
SS Fuhrer with a rank of Standartenführer or higher came firom the upper middle class
Boehnert, SS Officer Corps, puts the percentage of Upper middle class occupations for
the SS leadership at 33 % (pp. 163 - 164, Table 6 1) and 39 % (p 206, Table 206)
28) On the difficulties facing higher civil servants see Childers, National Soicalism
and the New Middle Class, p22, Mommsen, Beamtentum, p 197.
29) For the attraction that fascist movements and ideas held for the intellectual see JuanJ
Linz,
*
Some Notes Toward the Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Histori¬
cal Perspective," p. 40, in Walter L a q u e u r, ed , Fascism, A Readers Guide Analy¬
ses, Interpretations, Bibhography (Berkeley, 1976) and Alastair Hamilto n, The Appeal
of Fascism A Study of Intellectuals and Fascism 1919 -1945 (New York, 1971)
30) The manifold activities of the SS offered many employment opportunities for physi
cians and, for the most part, they carried out legitimate medical functions Neususs-
H u n k e 1, Die SS pp. 74. The duties of SS physicians are spelled out in a memorandum,
dated 21.1.1939, by Bngadefuhrer, Dr Grawitz, Reichsarzt-SS In addition to the more ob-
vious tasks that any physician might carry out,such as the treatment of mjunes, these duties
included the selection of recruits, the drawing up of hygiene guidehnes for clothing and
buildings, dietary counseling, sports medicine, cnminal pathology Records of the Reich
Leader SS and Chief of German Police, Washington* National Archives, Microcopy T-175/
17/620621-625.
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It has been suggested that both doctors ans lawyers had solid economic motives
for joining the Nazis, the former for the reason that either their earnings were
declining or they feared socialized medicine, and the latter because young
attorneys in particular suffered from an overcrowding of their profession 31).
As to students, their high proportion among SS-Führer comes as no
surprise for their attraction to fascist parties in general and their preponderance
within the NSDAP in particular have been well established 32). Since potentially
their advanced educational preparation predisposed them for privileged social
and economic Status, all those SS leaders who represented themselves as students
were classified as belonging to the Upper middle class. It appears that these
young men must have been unwilling to commit themselves to traditional pro¬
fessional careers because virtually all students within our samples had either just
finished secondary school, most of them with an A b i t u r, or had just dropped
out of a university before accepting the non-traditional careers of SS leaders
in Himmler's Black Order. Within the S S - T V and S S - V T respectively,
students constituted 17.4 percent and 16.3 percent of all former occupations
within the leadership of the SS. In fact, almost one half of all upper middle class
occupations were accounted for by the Student category. The only exception to
this pattern was the membership of the Allgemeine -SS where, be¬
cause the age structure of its membership was more advanced and most of the
men had full-time occupations before joining the SS, the proportion of students
was relatively insignificant.
SS ideology did not emphasize or particularly value the importance of educa¬
tion 33)} but there is no denying that a large share of the SS leadership was root-
31) Kater, Nazi party, pp. 67 - 68.
32) Noting the high proportion of high school students and university students within the
NSDAP, Kater Nazi Party, pp. 27, 44 speculates that perhaps as much as half of the
entire Student body may have joined the Nazis by 1930. Linz, Comparative Study, p.
67 maintains that students constituted an important segment of all fascist parties. Also ger-
mane to this matter are Hans Peter Bleuel and Ernst K 1 i n n e r t, Deutsche Stu¬
denten auf dem Weg ins Dritte Reich: Ideologien - Programme - Aktionen 1918 - 1935
(Gütersloh, 1967); Anselm Faust, Der Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund:
Studenten und Nationalsozialismus in der Weimarer Repubhk, I (Düsseldorf, 1973); Jürgen
Schwarz, Studenten in der Weimarer Repubhk. Die deutsche Studentenschaft in der
Zeit von 1918 bis 1923 und Ihre Stellung zur Pohtik (Berlin, 1971); Michael S. Stein¬
berg, Sabers and Brownshirts: The German Students' Path to National Socialism 1918 -
1935 (Chicago and London, 1977); Wolfgang Zorn, "Student Politics in the Weimar
Republic," in: Journal of Contemporary History 5 (1970), pp. 128 -143; Michael H. Ka¬
ter, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus in Deutschland 1918 - 1933. Eine sozial¬
geschichtliche Studie zur Büdungskrise in der Weimarer Repubhk (Hamburg, 1975). For the
period preceding the Great War see Konrad Jarausch, "Liberal Education as Illiberal Sociah¬
zation: The Case of Students in Imperial Germany," in: Journal of Modern History 50
(1978) pp. 609 - 630, and Jarausch, Students, Society and Politics in Imperial Germany:
The Rise of Academic Illiberalism (Princeton, 1982).
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ed in the educated bourgeoisie 3,4), As a whole the SS-Führerkorps
tended to be much better educated than the German population 35), with
roughly one third of its membership having either obtained an Abitur or
even attended a university 36). It seems that a university degree, or even an
above average education without a degree, still offered a preferential basis for
advancing into the leadership of the SS. The fact that a purposely avowed "open
elite" recruited a third of its membership from traditional elite groups of society
was not, however, because the educational advantage of an Abiturient,
or academic, was so highly valued. Rather it was because numerous positions
within the SS such as physicians, who, combined with lawyers, were the largest
single academically trained contingent in all SS branches, made certain minimum
academic training mandatory 37).
33) The relative non-importance of formal education was demonstrated by the entrance
requirements to the SS cadet schools; acceptance in these Junkerschulen was not dependent
on specific educational prerequisites. George H. Stein, The Waffen-SS, Hitler's Elite
Guard at War 1933 -1945 (Ithaca and London, 1966), p. 13, for example, concluded: "The
entrance requirements of the SS cadet schools were exacting with respect to racial, physical
and political factors, but education and nonpolitical background were discounted." Accor¬
ding to Himmler, some 40 % of the officer candidates accepted before 1939 had only an
elementary school education. "Rede des Reichsführer-SS vor SS-Gruppenführern am 8.11.
1937," T-175/90/2612395. See also Hausser, Waffen SS im Einsatz (Göttingen, 1953)
p. 13, and Neusüss-Hunkel. Die SS, pp. 23
- 24. By 1939 both professors and students were
viewed by National Socialists, including Hitler, with outright comtempt. Geoffrey J. G i -
1 e s, "German Students and Higher Education Policy in the Second World War,
"
in:
Central European History 17 (1984), pp. 330 - 354, here 330 - 31.
34) This is in agreement with the findings of both W e g n e r, Politische Soldaten, p.
228 and Boehnert, SS. Officer Corps, pp. 117-118.
35) Taking the male enrollment of pupils in secondary schools in 1938 (432,977) and the
number of male students matriculated at German universities in the Summer semester of
1938 (48,545),and comparing them to the male population age 11-19 and age 20 - 23 in
1938 respectively, one would expect that 9,4 % of German youth attended a secondary
school and 4,3 % a university. These figures were taken from the Statistisches Jahrbuch für
das Deutsche Reich 1935 and the Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 1928 -1944.
36) Even though a large number of SS leaders attended a university, a sizeable proportion
never completed their studies. More precisely, 28.8, 37.8, and 17.8 percent of the S S -
TV, S S - V T, and Allgemeine SS, respectively, never completed their univer¬
sity education.
37) The major field of study of those who attended a university reinforces the proportion
of men that we could identify as physicians and lawyers. For the three SS branches the
breakdown was as follows:
S S - T V 67,2 % Medicine, 10.6 % Jurisprudence
S S - V T 47.3 % Medicine, 14.9 % Jurisprudence
Allg. SS 42.3 % Medicine, 23.5 % Jurisprudence.
These finding seem to contradict those of Gunnar C. Boehnert, "The Jurists in the
SS - Führerkorps, 1925 - 1939, in: G. Hirsch feld and L. Kettenacker eds.,
Der 'Führerstaat': Mythus und Realität. Studien zur Struktur und Politik des Dritten
Reiches (Stuttgart, 1981), pp. 361 - 374 who identifies lawyers as the single largest acade¬
mically trained contingent of his "sample'*.
Table 1: Distribution of Occupational Groupings for SS-Fuhrer, their Fathers, SA-Fuhrer in 1935, the 1933 and
1938 NSDAP, and the Population of 1933
Occupational Groups
SS-Führer in 1938
SS-TV SS-VT Allg. SS SS-TV
Fathers
SS-VT Allg. SS
SA-Fuhrer
in 1933
NSDAP
in 1933
NSDAP
in 1938
Population
in 1933
Unskilled Workers
Skilied Workers
Military Eniistedb
Lower Class
Independent Craftsmen
Farmers
Small Businessmen
Salaried Employees
Civil Servants
Military: NCO
Nonacademic Professionals
Lower Middle Class
Managers
Higher Civil Servants
Professionals
Students
Entrepreneurs
Military: Officers
Upper Middle Class
Total
N of Cases
2.6 1.1 4.2 7.4 5.5 7.9 7.2 12.6 13.7 37.2
22.6 16.8 21.7 19.8 17.3 18.8 5.7 18.1 19.5 17.3
0.5 3.6 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.0 7.24
25-7 21.5 26.7 27.5 23.0 26.7 13.3 30.7 33.2 54.5
0.3 0.1 0.1 5.8 5.0 3.5 2.6 8.9 9.1 9.6
5.0 4.3 7.6 6.3 6.8 8.7 6.8 8.9 8.1 7.7
0.3 1.4 0.5 6.0 6.6 7.6 10.5 12.8 5.1 6.0
31.1 30.2 30.8 17.6 20.1 19.9 40.5 10.6 21.8 12.4
2.4 4.4 3.6 18.4 19.8 13.4 10.3 11.7 10.3 5.2
2.1 1.7 0.1 1.1 0.5 0.3 1.3
4.2 3.4 1.8
41.2 42.1 42.7 55.2 58.8 53.4 72.0 57.1 57.8 42.7
0.8 0.3 1.6 2.5 1.5 1.4 3.8 2.3 1.7 0.5
1.0 1.1 2.1 6.0 7.2 5.9 3.7 2.8 0.0 0.5
12.6 12.5 19.9 3.0 4.6 8.5 1.8 3.0 2.6 1.0
17.4 16.3 1.9 1.7 4.3 0.5
0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 2.0 3.2 2.5 2.4 0.4 0.3
1.3 6.2 5.1 3.6 2.9 0.9 0.5
33.1 36.4 30.6 17.3 18.2 19.9 12.3 12.2 12.7 2.8
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 97.6a 100.0 100.0 100.0
380 657 858 364 586 656 951 3,316 234 27,047,899
Sources:
(1) Percentages of occupations and classes in gainfully employed German population (except in the case of students) and
percentages of NSDAP joiners in the Reich figures calculated on the basis of data in Michael H Kater, The Nazi Party A social
Profile of Members and Leaders, 1919 1945 (Cambridge, MA, 1983), 241, 152,
(2) Percentages of occupations and classes for SA-Fuhrer are based on "standardized" occupations for men who joined the SA
between 1925 - 1933 «is calculated by Mathilde Jamin, Zwischen den Klassen Zur Sozialstruktur der SA-Fuhrerschaft (Wupper
tal, 1984), 194-953.
a) This column does not add up to 100 % because one of Jamm's categones, mithelfende Famüienangehonge (2 3 %), was not
includes in this table.
b) in cases marked by a dash ( ), the figure for this particular category could not be ascertamed
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Table 2. Highest Level of Educational Attainment
Educational Level SS-Branch
SS.TV SS.VT Allg.S
Primary School 34.7 25.0 37.0
Middle School 8.5 11.6 4.2
Secondary School 22.8 22.0 22.9
Secondary School w.
Abitur 13.5 16.4 4.3
University 4.9 8.3 5.3
University w. Degree 12.2 13.7 , 24.4
Other 3.4 2.8 2.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N of Cases 386 671 816
Furthermore, the bimodal distribution of the variable measuring educational
attainment also established that an almost equally sizable number of SS
Führer had attended only a Volksschule, while another proportion
completed only some sort of secondary education without an Abitur. The
latter, or any other qualifying school diploma, was not necessary to embark on a
Führer career, and neither the SS-VT nor S S - T V had designated
officer candidates in the same way the Wehrmacht did 38). In fact, if
the Abitur had been a prerequisite for entry into the Führerkorps,
only about one third of these men would have ended up as leaders of the SS.
The result was that university graduates rubbed Shoulders with men who had
completed as Httle as eight years of formal education. Despite certain vicissi¬
tudes within the various branches of the SS, the pattern brought out by the data
is clear and provides a simple and blunt message: in terms of education, the SS
leadership was distinguished by diversity. Formal education as an indispensable
necessity for social advancement was for all intents and purposes amoot consid¬
eration within the SS and, in this respect, National Socialism did bring about a
considerable social change.
Social Structure: An Assessment
The basis of recruitment for the leadership of Heinrich Himmler's Order was
sufficiently broad to invite the characterization of the SS leadership as an elite
which secured recruits - though in varying proportions — from the entire juste
38) W e g n e r, Politische Soldaten, pp. 140.
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milieu of German bourgeois society 39). From this heterogeneity in social ori¬
gins certain conclusions follow. To begin with, the group of people whom we
have analyzed hardly conforms to the usual picture we have of lower-middle
class Germans flocking to the banners of National Socialism. The high propor¬
tion of workers on the one hand and the even higher proportion of upper middle
39) A number of scholars and contemporary observers have pointed to a broad base of
support for fascism in general and National Socialism in particular As early as 1923 Clara
Ze t k l n, "Der Kampf gegen den Faschismus," cited in Ernst N o 11 e, ed , Theorien
über den Faschismus (Cologne and Berlin, 1967), p 88 observed that "the carrier of fascism
is not a small caste, but broad social groups, large masses which reach far into the prole
tanat
"
Others have echoed similar sentiments For example, Wolfgang Sauer, "Na
tional Socialism Totalitarianism or Fascism,
"
in American Historical Review LXII (1967),
p 410 has argued that "historical evidence shows that support of Fascism may not be con
fined to the classical elements of the middle class but may extend to a wide variety of
groups
"
In a similar vain Michael Hurst, "What is Fascism7" in The Historical Journal
XI (1968), p 179 has suggested that "component sectors of both fascism and national so
ciahsm could not be reduced to the lower middle class and the Lumpenproletanat, an assort
ed variety of soaal categones took an active part in the fascist movements
"
Heterogeneity
of social structure is also stressed by Eric G Reiche, The Development of the SA in
Nürnberg, 1922 1934 (New York, 1986), p 229, who concludes that "Hitler's supporters
m the Nürnberg SA came from all classes, except the upper class Neither predominantly
lower middle class nor largely workmg class in background, the Nürnberg SA appeared in
deed to be an Organization that appealed to virtually all sectors of the city's male popula
tion
*
As to the membership of the NSDAP, Wolfgang Zapf, Wandlungen der deut
sehen Ehte Ein Zirkulationsmodel Deutscher Fuhrungsgruppen 1919 1966 (Munich, 1965^
p 52 asserts that people from all occupations could be found in the early NSDAP Paul
M a d d e n "Some Social Characenstics of Early Nazi Party Members, 1919 1923," in
Central European History 15 (1982), p 48 suggests that the social composition of the early
NSDAP membership "was considerably more heterogeneous than has usually been suggest
ed
'
Harold J Gordon Jr, Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch (Princeton, 1972), p 82
likewise concluded that the preputsch Nazi movement as a whole constituted "a heteroge
neous mixture of people of all classes and all professions and trades" Heinrich A W l n k
1 e r, "Extremismus der Mitte7 Sozialgeschichdiche Aspekte der nationalsozialistischen
Machtergreifung," m VierteIjahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 20 (1972), pp 175 -191 charac
tenzed the mass basis of the NSDAP as dominantly middle class But because ofthesigmf
leant proportion of workers he concluded that the NSDAP was a Volkspartei and
not a class party of the bourgeois middle See also by the same author "Mittelstandsbewe
gung oder Volkspartei7 Zur sozialen Basis der NSDAP," in W Schieder, ed , Faschis
mus als soziale Bewegung, Hamburg, 1976, pp 97 118 An even more outspoken position
has been taken by M u hl b e r g e r, "The Sociology of the NSDAP," p 504 who, after
reviewing the quantitative evidence of numerous studies, asserts that "the NSDAP was a
genuine Volkspartei" securing "support from all social classes in German society
"
Richard
F Hamilton, Who Voted For Hitler7 (Princeton, 1982), pp 420 21 on the basis of
electoral analysis of 14 large eitles does not think that the lower middle class provided the
mass basis for National Socialism Thomas Childers, National Socialism and the New
Middle Class," in Reinhard Mann, ed, Die Nationalsozialisten, Analysen faschistischer Be
wegungen (Stuttgart, 1980), p 19 desenbed the NSDAP as "a catch-all party of middle class
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class representatives on the other, make it difficult at best to extend and sustain
for the leadership of the SS the thesis of lower-middle class preponderance
which has been repeatedly associated with the NSDAP membership and the
Nazi electorate. Beyond that, the same heterogeneity of the SS's social structure
does Httle to aid and abet the sweeping claims of classical elite theonsts that
elites are drawn from within narrowly constricted social or economic classes,
especially the upper class. Although nobody is methodologicallyso naive as to
accept all NS egalitarian rhetoric as the equivalent of the social-political reahty
of the Third Reich, our empirical evidence permits the conclusion that with
respect to the SS or, more specifically, the leadership ofthat Organization, a case
can be made that some of the egalitarian objectives were indeed realized.
protest" and "party of bourgeois Integration", while Jürgen W. F alter, "Warum die deut
sehen Arbeiter wahrend des Dritten Reiches zu Hitler standen Einige Anmerkungen zu
Günther Mais Beitrag über die Unterstützung des nationalsozialistischen Herrschaftssystems
durch Arbeiter," in. Geschichte und Gesellschaft (13 1987), pp 217 - 231, here 230 ar-
gues that based on the social profile of its voters and members, and taking into account the
geographical variations, the NSDAP was socially the most balanced of all parties As far as
its social structure was concemed, the NSDAP came dosest to being the ideal of a Volks
oder Integrationspartei.
